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As the contributions to this Symposium suggest, much could be done to
improve arbitration, particularly the sort of “new” or “mass” arbitration that has
sprouted during the past twenty-five years.  Mass arbitration stems from the
judiciary’s modern favorable attitude toward enforcement of arbitration
clauses, even those imposed upon consumers, employees, small vendors, and
debtors as part of a standardized contract of adhesion.  In a separate article,1 I
present a more comprehensive list of what I regard as the necessary steps that
must be taken to ensure minimally acceptable quality and fairness in mass arbi-
tration.  In this Article, I focus more specifically on the questions of impartial-
ity, adherence to substantive law, and judicial review, although these concerns
are of course also dimensions of any reasonably broad inquiry into quality.
Part I of this Article outlines a number of areas of concern regarding arbi-
tral fairness relative to that of courts.  Part II briefly recaps the modern pro-
arbitration jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that led to the explosion of mass
arbitration during the late twentieth century, which in turn created much greater
potential that arbitration could become an unfair forum for dispute resolution.
Of particular concern is the impartiality and competence of the arbitrator, con-
sistency with substantive law, and quality control through appellate review.
Part III advances three operational proposals for achieving this rough
equivalency between arbitration and litigation:  (1) a licensing system for arbi-
trators in “mass” arbitrations; (2) a default rule that arbitration follow substan-
tive law and reach results consistent with substantive law; and (3) replacement
of the current deferential standard of review for arbitration awards with appel-
late review similar to that accorded trial court decisions.  As explained in Part
IV, parties to a traditional commercial arbitration may stipulate to avoid these
default rules provided that their agreement is sufficiently clear, knowing, and
voluntary.  Part IV clarifies that parties in traditional commercial arbitration
may avoid the requirement of using licensed arbitrators bound to follow sub-
stantive law and may stipulate to restricted judicial review.
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I. THE RISE OF ARBITRATION AND THE SPECTER OF KANGAROO COURTS
The dramatic expansion of arbitration has been one of the most significant
developments of modern law.2  Prior to the 1980s, arbitration was relatively
common but largely confined to particular business and professional spheres.
In the 1980s,3 legal constraints confining arbitration in those spheres were sub-
stantially retracted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which announced a strong
national policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.  The 1960s pre-
saged some of these developments,4 and the 1970s saw the rise of the “alterna-
tive” dispute resolution (“ADR”) movement, in which arbitration was heralded
2 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 107-08
(discussing that collective contracting of the type taking place in mass arbitration systemati-
cally undermines traditional notions of contract consent and favors commercial entities draft-
ing self-serving contract provisions, including arbitration clauses); Stempel, supra note 1,
TAN 27 and generally TAN 2-37 (noting prominence of change in arbitration law relative to
other legal developments of the late twentieth century; describing in detail differences
between traditional commercial arbitration and new “mass” arbitration that essentially oper-
ates as wholesale privatization of dispute resolution in many sectors of the economy); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:  Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297,
334-40 (1996) (describing rapid assent of ADR during last quarter of twentieth century and
development of “new” mass arbitration); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System:  Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992) (describing traditional role of arbitration in guild); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better
Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1404 (1991) [herinafter Stempel, A Better
Approach to Arbitrability] (noting use of arbitration by merchants in Middle Ages). See
generally 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 1 (1994) (describing background and history of FAA, legislation
sought by shippers, traders, and other commercial entities); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926) (same).  In addition,
of course, arbitration has long been the common means of resolving disputes arising under a
union’s collective bargaining agreement. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON,
ARBITRATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (2d ed. 2006); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitra-
tion and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 922 (1979).
3 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that FAA creates body of
substantive federal law that must be applied in either state or federal court; state laws creat-
ing different treatment for certain arbitration contracts trumped by FAA; arguably overruling
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), which most observers read as applying
FAA only to federal court proceedings and viewing FAA as federal procedural statute rather
than setting forth substantive national law applicable in state courts as well); Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (requiring arbitration of construc-
tion and commercial dispute; applying FAA to require stay of litigation while question of
arbitrability decided; stating that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”). But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (permitting parties, by choosing particu-
lar state’s law as substantive law governing the contract, to avoid some applications of the
FAA).
4 In the “Steelworkers’ Trilogy,” the Supreme Court had taken a supportive and expansive
view of labor arbitration some twenty years prior to its arbitration revolution of the 1980s.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).  But these were labor arbitration
cases.  Under substantive U.S. labor law and policy, arbitration between unions and manage-
ment was specifically encouraged as a means of achieving industrial peace.
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as an effective means of streamlining adjudicative dispute resolution that would
save time and reduce costs.5  Arbitration decisions prior to the 1980s had begun
to display a more favorable judicial attitude toward enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements.6  But it was in the 1980s that the Court became smitten
with what I have termed “arbitral infatuation” and modified or reversed several
precedents that restricted arbitration.7  The Court has continued to have some-
thing of a “crush” on arbitration, rather than a more mature view of its positive
and negative traits.8
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967), the Court held that defense of fraud in the inducement to contract directed at the
contract as a whole must be first presented to the arbitrator and was not exempt from arbitra-
tion, a major victory for arbitration proponents that continues to have modern impact. See
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
5 See Richard Birke, Mandating Mediation of Money:  The Implications of Enlarging the
Scope of Domestic Relations Mediation from Custody to Full Service, 35 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 485 (1999) (describing rise of both community-based and business-based ADR move-
ments during the late 1960s and 1970s); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclec-
tic:  Liberating ADR From Ideology, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 247 (same).
6 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (refusing to apply statutory/
public policy arbitration of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to international arbitration
involving foreign investment); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforc-
ing arbitration clause in towing agreement for salvage of ship in international waters not-
withstanding nontrivial argument that agreement was signed under duress by marooned ship
owner).
7 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah:  Arbitral Infat-
uation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel,
Gomorrah]; see, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (overruling Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, and finding no statutory or public policy bar to
mandatory arbitration of claims made pursuant to Securities Act of 1933); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (rejecting “intertwining doctrine” of some
lower courts, which prevented arbitration of claim concededly subject to arbitration agree-
ment when claim was intertwined with one outside scope of arbitration clause or claim sub-
ject to statutory or public policy exception to arbitration; also noting strong federal policy
favoring arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (rejecting contention that antitrust claims, being statutorily based, are conse-
quently too public to be resolved through arbitration).
8 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA
preempts and precludes application of Montana statute requiring that arbitration clause be
typed in underlined capital letters on first page of agreement if clause is to be enforceable);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (giving FAA provision, and its
applicability to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” a broad reading
to the limits of the federal Commerce Clause power); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (enforcing arbitration clause; rejecting argument that
arbitration provision constitutes limitation on liability forbidden under Carriage of Goods at
Sea Act (“COGSA”)); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(rejecting argument that claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) may not be arbitrated, implicitly rejecting argument that section 1 of the FAA, 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1982), precludes arbitration of employment disputes; section 1 specifically states
that the Act does not apply to arbitration agreements in “contracts of employment,” and the
Court avoided conflict with this seemingly clear textual bar to arbitration enforceability by
treating arbitration agreement of broker Gilmer as not being part of his “contract of employ-
ment” because of standard securities industry practice of requiring arbitration in employer-
employee disputes). But see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)
(ruling that Court must grant some deference (rather than de novo review) to arbitrator’s
determination of arbitrability of dispute but holding in particular case that scope of arbitra-
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The Court continues to privilege arbitration.9  But the arbitration so lion-
ized by the Court is no longer confined to specialized commercial spheres but
has become a massive privatization of the adjudicatory function.  In addition to
the traditional parties and disputes historically found in arbitration, a genre of
“new” arbitration now exists in which arbitration is essentially imposed upon a
large, general class of consumers and workers.  Retailers and employers fre-
quently provide in standard contract forms that disputes with their customers or
workers are to be arbitrated through ad hoc, self-administered, or “in house”
arbitration tribunals rather than under the auspices of an established arbitration
provider such as the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).
Consumers, employees, and many legal scholars have attacked the use of
mass arbitration, arguing that:
• the Supreme Court engaged in improper judicial activism by misinterpreting the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1926 to create a national rule of arbitration clause
enforceability that outstripped any reasonable view of the intent of the enacting
Congress;
• expansive application of the FAA results in workers being forced to arbitrate work-
related disputes, a result inconsistent with at least the spirit of the law, which
tion clause was sufficiently narrow to require judicial scrutiny of whether arbitration clause
encompassed dispute between the parties); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52 (1995) (permitting arbitrators to award punitive damages in securities arbitration
notwithstanding the brokerage contract contained New York choice of law clause and New
York state law prohibits punitive damages awards in arbitration).
9 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 449 (holding that defense to arbitration
based on contract illegality is for the arbitrator in first instance; “challenge to the validity of
the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitra-
tor”); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 450-54 (2003) (question of whether
arbitration agreement “silent” on question of class actions permitted classwide arbitration
was initially for arbitrator rather than court; question of whether contract forbids class treat-
ment of claims is not a question of arbitrability that must first be decided by court); Pacifi-
Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003) (question of whether contract
provision restricting punitive and other damages prohibited treble damages pursuant to plain-
tiff physicians’ claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
was for arbitrator rather than court); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85
(2002) (applicability of NASD six-year time limit for bringing securities claim is matter
“presumptively for the arbitrator, not for the judge”); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (construing the venue provisions of the FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 9-11 (1994), regarding confirmation, vacation, or modification of arbitration to permit
proceedings in either district where award made or in any federal district available under
general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994)); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000) (arbitration clause silent regarding costs not sufficient to preclude
compelled arbitration on ground proceeding may be prohibitively expensive for consumer).
See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW
AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2007) (collecting and reviewing caselaw on arbitration); CHRISTO-
PHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  CASES AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2006)
(same); HUBER & WESTON, supra note 2 (same). See also William W. Park, Determining an
Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction:  Timing and Finality in American Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135 (2007);
Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169 (2007); Stephen
J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007). But see Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism
and State Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326 (2007) (extensive criticism of Buckeye Check
Cashing, Casarotto, and Bazzle as insufficiently respectful of state judicial and legislative
authority).
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includes a specific section that can reasonably be read as taking employment mat-
ters outside the scope of the Act;
• the new jurisprudence imposes arbitration upon individuals who certainly made no
conscious agreement to arbitrate and arguably did not give even de facto or con-
structive consent to arbitrate;
• displacement of public adjudication with private arbitration impoverishes the
growth and development of the law by reducing the amount of recorded precedent
and detailed opinion writing;
• increased arbitration removes too much of the normative function from dispute
resolution;
• arbitration potentially restricts the procedural advantages afforded by litigation;
• in particular, mass-market private arbitration undermines class actions and injunc-
tive relief; and
• results in arbitration tend to lower compensation to injured parties, particularly
regarding “non-economic” injuries such as mental distress and pain-and-suffering,
as well as reducing the prospects for an award of punitive damages even in cases of
egregious business behavior toward consumers.10
10 See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Con-
tracts:  A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Barbara Black, Is Securities
Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross,
Making It Up As They Go Along:  The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 991 (2001); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81
(1993); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331; Sara Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration:  A Constitutional Man-
date?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73 (2005); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering”
to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild
West:  Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005); Rich-
ard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts With Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819
(2003); Schwartz, supra note 2; Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, supra note 2;
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The Return of Uncon-
scionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 757 (2004) [hereinafter Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability]; Stempel, Gomor-
rah, supra note 7; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act:  Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory
Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637
(1996); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75 (2004).
This is not to suggest that legal scholars were uniformly skeptical about the Court’s
emerging arbitrability doctrine or the efficacy of arbitration itself.  Several have defended the
Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence and criticize suggestions for change or restrictions on
arbitration. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration:  Federal
Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
469; Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004);
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002); Christopher R. Drahozal,
“Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695; Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Pay-
ing the Price of Process:  Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
DISP. RESOL. 89; Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agree-
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Each of these criticisms (and their derivative cousins) has its own intellec-
tual emphases.  But in general, the criticisms11 posit that replacing litigation
with arbitration produces inferior outcomes or favors the institutional dispu-
tants that draft mass arbitration clauses.  Potentially disadvantaged in the new
world of mass arbitration are investors, consumers, employees, and buyers.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the three established definitions of
a “kangaroo court” are “1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the
principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied.  . . . 2. A
court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so
as to render a fair proceeding impossible.  3. A sham legal proceeding.”12
Black’s defines the term “kangaroo court” more negatively than would I.
For purposes of this article, a kangaroo court is either a dispute resolution
forum in which either the outcome is largely shaped in advance because of
biases of the decision-maker (a “true” kangaroo court in the historical meaning
of the term) or a forum in which the structure and operation of the forum result
in an inferior brand of adjudication even if the tribunal is not gripped with
intentional bias.  In particular, my view of a modern kangaroo court is one in
which institutional disputants (“repeat players”) have excessive and unfair
structural advantages over individual disputants (“one-shot players”).13  In this
article, I focus on the issues of arbitrator neutrality and consistently accurate
application of substantive law and do not specifically address the question of
arbitration procedure and remedies.
The proliferation of mass mandatory arbitration imposed on consumers,
investors, and employees raises the concern that these arbitration forums are
simply too stacked in favor of institutional disputants.  The specter of mass
ments—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB.
251 (2006).
See also EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT (2006) (reviewing respective scholarly positions regarding arbitration); STE-
PHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 214 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that “theoretical advantages of arbitration over court
adjudication are manifold” but “are not always fully realized,” and listing expertise of deci-
sion-maker, finality of decision, privacy of proceedings, procedural informality, low cost,
and speed as theoretical advantages).
11 Except perhaps concern over the Court’s alleged rewriting of the FAA to become sub-
stantive federal law rather than a rule applicable to federal court proceedings.  This is more
of a criticism of judicial method rather than a criticism of arbitration itself. See, e.g., Car-
rington & Haagen, supra note 10; David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free:
How “Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400 (2007).
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 382 (8th ed. 2004).  The term is most commonly traced to the
mid-nineteenth century American West, where irregular or rump tribunals were sometimes
quickly conferred to pass harsh judgment on suspected criminals, with the “court” making
illogical “leaps” toward a conclusion of guilt and “bouncing” the defendant to the gallows.
13 See Stempel, supra note 1 (addressing overall quality concerns regarding arbitration).
The concept of disputing systems working differently for sophisticated, institutional, “repeat
players” and “one-shot” players is now widely known but was not well defined and
described until Marc Galanter’s now-classic article: Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  Today, analy-
sis of legal rules and systems according to their respective impact on these two groups is
widespread. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341 (2007).
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arbitrations as kangaroo courts can thus not be summarily rejected.  Lower
courts appeared tacitly to recognize the problem and breathed new vitality into
the venerable but atrophied contract doctrine of unconscionability.14
The Supreme Court is unlikely to revise its current caselaw that is insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the issues of arbitration clause enforcement in the arena of
mass contracts affecting consumers and employees.  Absent federal legislative
intervention, it currently seems inevitable that mass arbitration will continue to
take place, subject perhaps to the ability of certain interest groups to obtain
favorable legislation exempting them from the reach of mandatory predispute
arbitration clauses.15  Consequently, it is in my view imperative that mass arbi-
tration be conducted by unbiased arbitrators and required, at least as a default
rule, to reach results consistent with the law.  During the second quarter-cen-
tury of the “arbitration revolution,” it is probably far too late to revisit (much
less reverse) the arguable judicial errors that propelled the jurisprudential sea
change in favor of mass arbitration.  Rather than continuing to fight that battle,
arbitration critics, courts, and legislatures should focus primarily on ensuring
neutrality in mass arbitration and its fidelity to substantive law.16
14 By “lower courts,” I mean courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Davis v.
O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying California law); Walker v.
Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying Tennessee law);
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law); Gibson v. Neigh-
borhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Indiana law); Simpson
v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663 (S.C. 2007); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v.
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002);
Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2000);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). But see Haw-
kins v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing unconscionabil-
ity as potential defense to arbitration clause enforcement but holding that decision regarding
unconscionability was for arbitrator). See generally Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionabil-
ity, supra note 10.  The judicial revival of unconscionability also logically suggests that
courts can police arbitrations according to the degree to which the arbitral forum employs
sufficiently neutral and unbiased arbitrators and the degree to which arbitration results
accord with those that would be obtained in courts of law.
15 See Justin Kelly, Exemption from FAA for Farm Contracts Clears First Hurdle, ADR
World.com, May 22, 2007, http://adrworld.com/sp.asp?id=41102 (registration required).
16 Commentators have of course suggested that the law of compelling arbitration be
changed, at least for mass mandatory arbitration currently imposed on consumers and
employees. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 452 (1996); Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward
Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58
(2007); Christopher J. Kippley & Richard A. Bales, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent
Protections to Arbitration Agreements Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J. 10
(2007); Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (if Imposed on the
Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007).
With due respect for these suggestions, many of which I think are worth adopting in
addition to my proposals, I am concerned that efforts to exempt categories of cases from
arbitration will flounder politically and that legislation providing notice and warning, if
enacted, will not be particularly effective as a practical matter in light of the necessarily
cavalier manner in which the average consumer or employee is willing to sign most any
boilerplate contract containing an arbitration clause. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203
(2003).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ111.txt unknown Seq: 8 17-JAN-08 14:03
258 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:251
II. CONCERNS REGARDING MASS ARBITRATION:  NEUTRALITY,
FIDELITY TO LAW, AND QUALITY CONTROL
The world of mass contract arbitration is different than traditional com-
mercial arbitration.  In these high-volume, often lower-stakes cases, there will
only be a single arbitrator—and he or she is more likely to be less experienced
and accomplished than the arbitrators employed by AAA or JAMS (Judicial
and Mediation Services) in connection with large commercial disputes.  If the
junior arbitrator is underemployed, the arbitration fees received may create
some incentive to keep receiving cases from the arbitration service, which in
turn may prompt the attorney arbitrator to refrain from any ruling that might
too greatly displease the institutional disputant that crafted the arbitration pro-
gram and other potential mass contractor business clients.  Under these circum-
stances, an effective American arbitration policy is one that more self-
consciously addresses issues of arbitration competence and neutrality.  The
bulk of unconscionability challenges to arbitration have involved companies
that established their own arbitration system rather than selecting to have dis-
putes arbitrated before an established provider.17
Any failure of mass arbitration to follow applicable substantive law raises
additional concerns.  In the pre-1980s world of traditional commercial arbitra-
tion, the parties often sought arbitration to have arbitrators familiar with a given
industry apply the customary norms of the industry.  But in mass arbitration,
the disputes are much more likely to focus on consumer rights, employment
protections, fair treatment of investors, and other statutory questions.  Where
arbitration is not specific to a guild, trade, or particular business activity, the
traditional rationale of promoting arbitration for its “rough justice” loses much
of its force.  By contrast, the case for insisting that mass arbitration results be
consistent with substantive law becomes overwhelmingly strong.
A further problem surrounding arbitration is the limited appellate review
of arbitration decisions.  The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and the Uniform
Arbitration Act (“UAA”) both provide only limited review of arbitration
awards and create a strong presumption in favor of confirming and enforcing
arbitration decisions with relatively little scrutiny as to the correctness of the
decision, particularly its application of the law.18  In general, arbitration awards
will be set aside only if the arbitrator exceeds the scope of his or her authority,
acts with bias, or refuses to hear key evidence.  The arbitrator’s decision need
not be in accord with the prevailing law so long as the arbitrator does not
demonstrate “manifest disregard” of the law, an odd and awkward yardstick for
review used by some courts in order to inject some legal rigor in the review of
arbitration decisions.19  Labor arbitrations, like commercial arbitrations, also
17 See supra note 14.
18 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000) (establishing limited judicial review
of arbitration awards); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 11-13 (1956) (same); UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT §§ 22-24 (amended 2000) (providing more judicial review than found in original UAA
but considerably less review than that accorded to trial court appeals).
19 See HUBER & WESTON, supra note 2, ch. 8. See, e.g., Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T.
Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing judicially created
“manifest disregard of law” standard for setting aside arbitration awards in limited
circumstances).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ111.txt unknown Seq: 9 17-JAN-08 14:03
Fall 2007] KANGAROO COURTS 259
need not follow the law so long as the arbitrator’s ruling on a grievance “draws
its essence from the . . .  agreement.”20
Arbitration clauses may themselves provide for no right of judicial review.
Attempts to contract for expanded judicial review generally have been rejected
by courts as an improper private attempt to expand the court’s jurisdiction
beyond that conferred by the Federal Arbitration Act.21  But there is much to be
gained from expanding appellate review of arbitration awards to something
more closely resembling judicial review of trial court outcomes.  To some
extent, there has been a gradual movement in favor of making arbitration pro-
ceedings and outcomes less opaque.  Until the last twenty years, most arbitra-
tion awards were mere statements of who won and who lost and the amount of
any monetary award.  In reaction to the sudden expansion of mass contract
arbitration and criticism of the lack of transparency in arbitration, many arbitral
organizations began requiring the issuance of “reasoned” awards akin to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by courts rendering decision after
a bench trial.22
The rationale for requiring reasoned awards was that the discipline of
explaining the decision would encourage more reflective, carefully considered
decisions by arbitrators.  In addition, the explanation contained in the reasoned
award is thought to not only provide greater transparency but also to inspire
greater confidence in the results reached in arbitration.  However, one cannot
help but note the incongruity between the movement toward reasoned awards
and the extremely limited review of the award, particularly its application of
the law.  Put another way:  What good is a reasoned award that does not follow
the law?  Under the current system, an arbitrator can issue a reasoned award
that conclusively demonstrates legal error and the reviewing court is required to
confirm and enforce the award even though it would never do so if the opinion
were issued by a court of law.
III. THREE PROPOSALS FOR MINIMIZING THE DANGERS
OF MASS ARBITRATION
This article advances three operational proposals for achieving this rough
equivalency between arbitration and litigation:  (1) a licensing process for arbi-
trators presiding over “mass” arbitrations; (2) a requirement that arbitration fol-
20 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
21 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbi-
tration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); see, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925
(10th Cir. 2001).
22 Since the 1990s, a number of arbitration organizations and popular arbitration clauses
have stated that either party may demand that the arbitrator enter a “reasoned” award provid-
ing an explanation of the arbitrator’s decision. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVI-
SORY, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROTOCOL:  A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL
FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES princ. 15(3) (1998), reprinted in
HUBER & WESTON, supra note 2, at app. H (“At the timely request of either party, the
arbitrator should provide a brief written explanation of the basis for the award.”).  Prior to
this development, the typical arbitration award simply identified the prevailing party and the
amount of the award.
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low substantive law, at least as a default rule; and (3) replacement of the
current deferential standard of review for arbitration awards with appellate
review similar to that accorded trial court decisions.
A. The Quality (Both Neutrality and Competence) of the Arbitrator:  The
Need for More Stringent Standards and Licensing of Arbitrators Used
in Mass Arbitration
The greater pervasiveness of mass arbitration as compared to traditional
commercial arbitration requires increased government attention to the imparti-
ality of mass arbitrators.  As discussed in Part IV, infra, the current relaxed
rules regarding arbitrator disqualification or “evident partiality” as a standard of
review function adequately, perhaps even well, in traditional commercial arbi-
tration.  It is insufficient, however, where the arbitration represents large-scale
privatization of statutory and other legal questions, rather than questions of
industry custom and practice.  In stark contrast to litigation, where jurists are
subject to enforceable rules designed to foster impartiality and resist corruption,
there is currently no government mechanism for attempting to foster arbitrator
neutrality and competence.
Mass arbitration decision-makers should have no conscious or uncon-
scious favoritism toward a disputant because of the disputant’s identity or the
persons, concepts, or entities represented by the disputant.  To take an obvious
example, it is unfair to have the Smith v. Jones arbitration presided over by
Smith’s brother.  So strong is our commitment to the principles of neutrality
and detachment that our system does not permit Smith’s brother to adjudicate
Smith’s dispute even if there is powerful evidence that the brother and Smith
are estranged or have actual enmity toward one another.  In the latter case, in
fact, Smith himself would have every right to eject his own brother from the
role of adjudicator.  Even with nearly irrefutable proof of the brothers’ indiffer-
ence to one another, the adjudication system insists that the brother not preside
over the Smith case because the brother’s impartiality may nonetheless be rea-
sonably called into question by an objective observer.
Because arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by litigation, the logical
default rule for assessing an arbitrator’s neutrality should be the neutrality
norms found in the litigation system.  Years of experience and a few embarrass-
ments have led to the development of a system of judicial disqualification that,
although imperfect, provides a rational structure that works reasonably well in
practice.  Absent countervailing considerations, the same norms and require-
ments of neutrality should be imposed—at least as a default matter—upon arbi-
tration tribunals.
In operation, this means that, at a minimum, an arbitrator should not sit on
a case where the same arbitrator would not be permitted to sit as a judge or a
juror.23  Because arbitrators are generally private actors rather than public offi-
cials and hear far fewer disputes than do judges, application of the principle
23 Regarding judicial disqualification, see 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987) (reviewing history and
operation of judicial recusal; criticizing status quo of individual U.S. Supreme Court justices
making unreviewable individual decisions regarding their participation in cases).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ111.txt unknown Seq: 11 17-JAN-08 14:03
Fall 2007] KANGAROO COURTS 261
should not be difficult.  However, the difficulty is increased where the arbitra-
tor is chosen by an arbitration services provider and where the litigants are
provided little background information about the arbitrator.  Particularly in
smaller stakes disputes, the disputants are unlikely to invest substantial
resources for investigating arbitrators and challenging arbitrator assignments.
The “repeat player” or “insider” problem is of particular concern in that arbitra-
tion clauses are normally drafted and imposed by particular disputants (e.g.,
sellers, manufacturers, employers) who have an economy of scale, greater bar-
gaining power, greater disputing expertise, and potential leverage over individ-
ual arbitrators or arbitral organizations.24
Although the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”) and arbitration
best practice protocols make substantial steps in this direction, they are insuffi-
cient to address adequately the quality concerns surrounding mass arbitration.
The RUAA provides that an “individual who has a known, direct, and material
interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and
substantial relationship with a party may not serve as [a neutral arbitrator].”25
Although this admonition is a distinct improvement over the status quo, which
tends to take arbitrator conflict seriously only if palpably manifested during the
proceeding itself, it is not as stringent a standard as the rules of judicial
disqualification.
Further, the RUAA, promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners in
2000, has been enacted in only a handful of states.  For now, the RUAA is
likely to be viewed by many courts as only a suggestion rather than a statutory
directive.  In addition, the legal force of the RUAA is unclear in cases involv-
ing interstate commerce and the FAA because of preemption issues.  The rules
of arbitration providers are likewise easily avoided by mass contractors through
simply failing to retain these more ethics-conscious providers for their arbitra-
tion programs.  Similarly, voluntary protocols are just that—voluntary and
nonbinding.
The mass arbitration system thus needs enforceable disqualification rules
equivalent to those of courts.  This in turn requires that the RUAA be strength-
ened in this regard and enacted by state legislatures.  More important, in light
of the broad scope of preemption currently accorded the FAA, is that the FAA
be amended to include improved requirements for arbitrator impartiality.
To help affect this regime of mass arbitration impartiality, equivalent to
that of courts, I also propose a licensing process for arbitrators.  In this manner,
states can take helpful action to reduce biased mass arbitration even if they are
unable to reverse the current law of arbitration preemption or to obtain amend-
ment of the FAA.  In addition, the licensing entity would be responsible for
assembling and making accessible basic information regarding arbitrators and
their decisional track records.  Under my proposal, only licensed arbitration
providers could be used in mass arbitrations.  Failure to specify a licensed arbi-
tration provider would make the arbitration clause unenforceable or subject to
24 See Galanter, supra note 13.
25 See RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11(b) (amended 2000).  Section 12(a) of RUAA
requires that a prospective arbitrator disclose “any known facts that a reasonable person
would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator . . . .”
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reformation (to substitute a licensed arbitrator) at the request of the party in
dispute with the contract drafter.
Licensing could take place by regulators at either a federal or state level.
If licensing is done by the federal government, logical loci for the licensing
function would be the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, or
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  State-based licensing could be
administered by the state attorneys general, secretaries of state, or an appropri-
ate state consumer protection organization.  If the federal government entered
the licensing arena, states would retain the option to bar use of a federally
licensed arbitration service in disputes involving their residents, businesses, or
property located in the state if the responsible state agency were to find the
arbitration provider not to meet the state’s minimal criteria for neutrality and
competence.
The licensing would work as follows:  A prospective arbitrator would
apply to be licensed by the relevant agency.  The application would require the
arbitrator to provide background information as to his or her qualifications and
information sufficient for the licensing agency to be satisfied that the arbitrator
is sufficiently independent and likely to disqualify herself when a potential
mass arbitration case requires such disqualification according to the standards
applicable to judges.  The agency would then determine whether to issue the
license based on the applicant’s compliance with standards requiring sufficient
neutrality and competence to merit receipt of a license.  In order to get licensed,
an arbitrator would need to make at least a modest showing that he or she has
minimum education and training in the importance of impartiality and that he
or she has a sufficient guarantee of livelihood that is not dependent on a partic-
ular disputant or arbitration provider.  As part of the effort to ensure sufficient
neutrality in arbitration, the licensing process should require that arbitrators be
selected in a manner reasonably likely to ensure that the arbitrators do not have
pre-existing bias in favor of mass contractors utilizing their services.
In addition, a prospective mass arbitrator would also have to demonstrate
to the licensing agency that he or she has adequate competence to render deci-
sions consistent with substantive law.  The mass arbitrator need not be a lawyer
but should have at least some legal training or be familiar with the subject
matter of the arbitration (e.g., consumer lending, workplace norms).  At a mini-
mum, the mass arbitrator must have an educational level sufficient to satisfy the
licensing agency that he or she can be adequately educated on the law as neces-
sary by the disputants.  As with other types of licensing, the governmental
licensing authority could request further information in cases of doubt.
In addition, the system must provide for supervision and enforcement after
licensing.  Mass arbitrators should be required to renew their licenses annually,
through a process that requires updating personal information and reporting as
to the arbitrator’s arbitration activity during the prior year.  In particular, arbi-
trator decisions and parties affected should be reported.  The arbitrator would
be required to report outcomes in his or her cases to the agency, which would
maintain a publicly accessible archive that could be consulted by disputants.
Disputants would be able to at least know the arbitrator’s overall track record in
favoring claimants or defendants.  Armed with this information, either dispu-
tant would have the option of seeking a different arbitrator.
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To facilitate ongoing supervision, mass arbitration disputants should be
advised that the arbitrator is subject to licensing and that party complaints can
be reported to the licensing agency.  The agency is then charged with investi-
gating complaints and taking adequate action in response, including possible
suspension or revocation of licenses.
Licensing fees should be sufficiently high to produce adequate revenue
sufficient to operate this type of extensive licensing and supervision.  Mass
arbitrator licensing would resemble bar association regulation of attorneys.
Where the mass arbitrator is a lawyer, the licensing agency would be empow-
ered to refer complaints to the applicable disciplinary authority for attorneys in
addition to taking whatever action the arbitration licensing agency deems
appropriate.
Although effectively implementing the licensing process will of course be
neither perfect, nor easy, nor swift, it offers substantial advantages to the dis-
pute resolution system.  Currently, arbitral organizations, to a large extent,
compete for business by attempting to woo the producers of mass standardized
contracts containing (or that have the ability to contain) arbitration clauses.
This creates an undue tendency for the arbitration provider and its arbitrators to
structure and market itself as an organization that will serve the business inter-
ests of the mass contract producer as opposed to an organization that will best
serve the cause of neutral and competent justice.  To put it bluntly, an arbitra-
tion provider is unlikely to be chosen by Ralph’s Retail Emporium by trumpet-
ing its consumer-friendly arbitrators, its suspicion of high interest rates, and its
aversion to aggressive creditor’s remedies.
By contrast, under a licensing system, contract drafters and arbitration
providers would need to assemble a “stable” of licensed arbitrators in order to
enforce arbitration clauses and conduct mass arbitrations.  If done correctly,
this holds the prospect of minimizing the chances of arbitrations becoming kan-
garoo courts by making it unlikely that a key component of “kangarooism”—
the self-appointed, biased, or autocratic decision-maker—will be found in mass
arbitrations.  In particular, it will make it less likely that those inspired by the
ulterior commercial motives of limiting liability or achieving desired results at
variance with the law can do so by arranging for a decision-maker biased in
their favor.
To a degree, of course, the current system—which is largely a “free mar-
ket” in which arbitration services compete for patronage—accomplishes some
of the goals sought by licensing.  For at least a segment of the market, there is
value in choosing an arbitration provider that is reasonably well respected and
not perceived as a kangaroo court.  A provider of mass contracts may suffer
adverse publicity and business injury if it is perceived as attempting to use
kangaroo court arbitration to gain unfair advantage over its customers, vendors,
or the public.  Although these economic incentives toward arbitral fairness are
not trivial, neither are they particularly powerful.  A company’s problematic
arbitration conduct is unlikely to be significantly salient to its overall customer
base or the general public.
Vendors using mass contracts are unlikely to have adequate incentives,
when structuring their arbitration programs, to promote the neutrality and com-
petence of the arbitrators.  They are far more likely to be attracted to arbitration
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systems that may look acceptable but on average render decisions favorable to
the mass contractor.  In particular, the mass contractor will be looking to estab-
lish an arbitration system (and use of an arbitration service) that will give the
mass contractor more favorable results than it could obtain in the litigation
system.  Arbitrator licensing can greatly reduce the prospect of success for this
sort of self-interested behavior.  It may be acceptable for businesses to seek use
of industry arbitrators or individual lawyer-arbitrators to avoid the sometimes
erratic or irrational behavior of juries.  However, it is not acceptable for mass
contractors to pursue arbitration in order to avoid obligations imposed by law.
Licensing holds the prospect of limiting the worst excesses of the market
while allowing the market to operate with significant freedom.  After licensing
is in place, there will presumably be a reasonably large number of arbitration
providers that may be used by mass contractors.  Some mass contractors may
wish to specify use of a particular arbitration provider in the arbitration clause
of the mass contract.  Other mass contractors may wish to wait until after a
dispute arises in order to select a licensed arbitration provider.  Some mass
contractors may even wish to permit the non-drafting party to commence arbi-
tration before a licensed arbitrator of its choice.  Under any of these scenarios,
the government is not requiring that the mass contractor or other disputants use
any particular arbitration provider.  The government, through licensing, is
merely requiring that arbitrations be conducted by approved, adequately neutral
arbitrators.
A licensing system holds promise for avoiding kangaroo court arbitrations
and creating a minimum level of arbitrator neutrality and quality.  But, to per-
haps state the obvious, it is hardly a panacea.  Even the best licensing schemes
raise the prospect that licensing may merely raise barriers to entry for service
providers, increasing costs and decreasing selection.  Where the licensing is
poorly done, it imposes this disadvantage without any corresponding advan-
tages.  At its worse, licensing itself may become corrupt, with licenses going to
the politically favored applicants that are bad service providers while higher
quality applicants are denied licenses.
B. Arbitration Should Apply Applicable Substantive Law Unless There is
Clear, Knowing, and Voluntary Agreement to Adopt Different Criteria
for Decision.  To Effect the Rule of Law in Mass Arbitration, Mass
Arbitration Must be Subject to Expanded Judicial Review.
Because mass arbitration is a parallel universe of privatized dispute resolu-
tion largely imposed upon investors, consumers, and employees by institutional
entities, it should as a general matter be governed by the same substantive law
that would control those legal disputes in court.  Allowing arbitration outcomes
to be determined by the “law of the shop” makes sense where the arbitration
actually involves a particular commercial or trade activity.  It makes no sense,
however, when the arbitration deals not with custom and practice in a segment
of the economy, but instead involves securities law, banking law, product
safety, discrimination, or workers’ rights.
For mass arbitration, there is, in effect, no “shop.”  Instead, mass arbitra-
tion involves the general law rather than industry practice.  Consequently, mass
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arbitration outcomes should be consistent with the general law.  Unlike tradi-
tional arbitration, mass arbitration functions as a generalist form of dispute res-
olution.  Logically, it should be subject to the general law, at least
presumptively.
As discussed in Part IV, infra, traditional commercial arbitration need not
be bound by this approach and parties should be able to contract out of strict
compliance with legal rules.  This, however, leads to the problem of line-draw-
ing and determining when party stipulation to avoid a default rule is sufficiently
valid to rebut the presumption in favor of governing law (also addressed in Part
IV).
This in turn requires that arbitration awards be reviewed more broadly to
assure compliance with the law.  The FAA and the UAA both provide only
limited review of arbitration awards and create strong presumptions in favor of
confirming and enforcing arbitration decisions with relatively little scrutiny as
to the correctness of the decision, particularly its application of the law.26  The
RUAA does not provide a significantly greater scope of review and, despite its
generally admirable reformist tendencies, stops short of requiring that arbitra-
tion follow applicable substantive law.27
Under current law, arbitration awards generally will be set aside only if
the arbitrator exceeds the scope of his or her authority, acts with bias, or refuses
to hear key evidence.  The arbitrator’s decision need not be in accord with the
prevailing law so long as the arbitrator does not demonstrate “manifest disre-
gard” of the law, an odd and awkward yardstick for review used by some courts
in order to inject some legal rigor in the review of arbitration decisions.28
Labor arbitrations, like commercial arbitrations, also need not follow the law so
long as the arbitrator’s ruling on a grievance “draws its essence from the . . .
agreement.”29
Adjudication carries with it the right of appeal, including full review of the
trial court’s application of the law (with limited review of the trial court’s fac-
tual determinations).  Review of arbitration awards is considerably more lim-
ited.  In litigation, review of trial court decisions can involve challenges to fact-
finding (evaluated under a “clearly erroneous” standard”), exercises of judicial
discretion (evaluated under an “abuse of discretion” standard), and application
26 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 13 (1956).
27 See RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23-24 (amended 2000).
28 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234 (2007)
(expressing reservations about manifest disregard as ground for review but advocating that it
would be better defined, restrained, and consistently applied); Norman S. Poser, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards:  Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 473
(1998) (criticizing manifest disregard of law standard of review as inadequate and advocat-
ing expanded review); Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Rein-
ing in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385 (2007) (largely defending
manifest disregard as grounds for reversal but advocating expanded judicial power to modify
defective arbitration awards under review); see also Cole, supra note 21 (advocating greater
freedom of disputing parties to agree upon expanded judicial review of arbitration awards).
29 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(establishing “essence of the agreement” test); see also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Para-
digm for Commercial Arbitration:  Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards
and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998) (reviewing
grounds for vacating commercial and labor arbitration awards).
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of the law (evaluated by the appellate court’s “de novo” review of the law).30
Arbitration would be improved by replacement of the current deferential “man-
ifest disregard” of law standard of review for arbitration awards with appellate
review similar to that accorded trial court decisions.
Arguably, the current level of respective scrutiny for arbitration and litiga-
tion is irrationally transposed.  Logically, the level of review of mass arbitration
decisions should be more searching than that applied to review of trial and jury
outcomes.  Judges, whatever their faults, generally only become judges after a
substantial vetting process prior to appointment, confirmation, or election.  By
contrast, mass arbitrators may obtain their power over disputes without demon-
strating the type of qualifications routinely insisted upon for judges.  Lay jurors
arguably are subject to more scrutiny than many mass arbitrators.
The reasons for the different systems of review are largely historical.
When the FAA was passed in 1926, it responded to the perception that courts
were jealous of their jurisdiction, reluctant to share it with arbitrators, and gen-
erally hostile to arbitration.31  In response, the Act required courts to enforce
predispute arbitration agreements specifically and imposed a deferential stan-
dard of review for arbitration awards.32  The paradigmatic commercial problem
addressed by the FAA was that of a “shirking vendor,” unwilling to pay a bill
or perform a contractual obligation.  Arbitration under the FAA was designed
to achieve rapid resolution of these disputes so that the shirking vendor would
not unduly delay its obligations by engaging in litigation-related delay tactics.
Arbitration was expected to render swift decisions consistent with commercial
norms.  Under section 10 of the FAA, arbitration awards were to be confirmed
absent certain limited problems with the award, including an arbitrator exceed-
ing the scope of his or her authority or displaying evident partiality.
The system of commercial arbitration (and the FAA was concerned only
about commercial arbitration and gave no thought to consumer arbitration,
another indication of the datedness of the Act) thus greatly constrained appel-
late judicial review not only to expedite commercial dispute resolution but also
out of fear that hostile courts might unduly meddle in arbitration decisions.  For
labor arbitration, which became legally protected years later from legislation
and judicial receptivity to labor arbitration, the standard of review was even
more deferential.33
Today’s world of mass arbitration is substantially different.  Courts no
longer resist arbitration but embrace it.  Arbitration has spread widely beyond
its original specialized merchant-to-specialized merchant core and has become
the new, mass arbitration of consumer and other mass contract disputes.  Arbi-
tration organizations and the number of disputes have mushroomed.  Arbitra-
30 See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(3d ed. 1999).
31 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969-91 (1999) (discussing history of commer-
cial arbitration and background of FAA).
32 See supra notes 1-5.
33 As previously discussed, a labor arbitration award was to be confirmed and enforced by
the courts so long as the award “drew its essence from the agreement,” no matter how badly
the arbitrator may have construed the collective bargaining agreement and the grievance at
hand. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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tors are no longer drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of a trade or
industry’s “wise men” knowledgeable in the unwritten norms of the trade, but
may be lawyers or businesspersons with only passing experience in the subject
matter of the dispute.  And, of course, some of the arbitration providers and
arbitrators may be unduly oriented toward pleasing the mass contractors that
create much of the arbitration business.
Under these circumstances, it seems only logical that modern arbitration
awards—particularly in areas of mass arbitration such as consumer matters—
should be subjected to a level of scrutiny at least roughly comparable to that
applied to litigation outcomes at trial.  Quality control helps to ensure that dis-
pute outcomes accord with substantive law and that proceedings are substan-
tively fair.  Appellate review is quality control.  Unless proponents of mass
arbitration can marshal evidence to suggest mass arbitration outcomes are more
frequently correct than trial court outcomes, its seems only logical that both
means of dispute resolution should be subject to equivalent levels of quality
control.34
Thus, increasing the scope of appellate review of arbitration awards would
provide a major protection against low quality or unfair arbitration rulings.  To
the extent possible, arbitration awards should receive appellate review as
searching as that applied to court cases of similar magnitude and complexity.
In application, this would mean that arbitration results under appellate scrutiny
would be subject to a clearly erroneous review of the factual determinations of
the arbitrator, arbitrator rulings on conduct of the hearing would be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, and the arbitrator’s pure legal rulings
would be subject to de novo review.
Applying the traditional standards of appellate review to arbitrations
would not be an expensive or cumbersome process.  The record in most arbitra-
tions is thin and would not require extensive judicial resources for factual
review.  Applying a clearly erroneous standard, the court would upset arbitra-
tions for factual error only where the party challenging the arbitration can
demonstrate that a material mistake was made.  Where the party seeking to set
aside an arbitration award has paid for a hearing transcript, the challenging
party would still be required to point to portions of the record demonstrating a
fact-finding mistake by the arbitrator.
An arbitration that makes an obvious and important error of law should
not stand.  Under the current system of arbitration review, many courts see
themselves as powerless to vacate an arbitration award even where legal error
is apparent.  Other courts will intervene if they find “manifest disregard” of the
law, but this standard is far weaker than the traditional de novo review applied
in litigation.  Under the “manifest disregard” standard, the arbitrator must be
clearly apprised of the law and must more or less expressly enter an award at
34 To a degree, the “market” of dispute resolution is speaking on this issue in that many
parties to arbitration agreements appear to wish to receive expanded judicial review akin to
that accorded trial court decisions rather than the truncated review provided by the FAA.
See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)
(refusing to abide by arbitration clause provision for expanded judicial review); Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Chi. Typographical Union No.
16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
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variance with this known law.35  Although courts have substantial creative
room in applying the “manifest disregard” standard, it remains an overly lim-
ited, cumbersome tool.  Full scale de novo review of an arbitrator’s legal deci-
sions would provide a more rational means of quality control.36  It would also
eliminate the legal gymnastics and arguably judicial subterfuge that can occur
under the current model when courts occasionally strain to find that legal error
was “manifest disregard” of the law, or outside the scope of an arbitration sub-
mission.  In England, a country with a legal system hospitable to arbitration,
awards may be reviewed on grounds of legal error.37
IV. APPRECIATING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION
AND MASS ARBITRATION—AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING
NEUTRALITY, APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Arbitration today is no longer the small world of diamond dealers, cotton
merchants, and shippers agreeing to resolve disputes according to industry
norms in a streamlined all-in-the-extended-commercial-family process.  That
sort of traditional, “old” arbitration of course still exists—but it no longer rep-
resents the bulk of arbitration.  Today, “new” arbitration imposed by mass con-
tract and formalist contract construction dominates the field, at least in volume
if not funds at stake.  More importantly, this type of new mass contract arbitra-
tion forms the great bulk of arbitration of concern to commentators.  The forced
arbitration of consumer, employment, civil rights, statutory disputes, and other
matters implicating public policy is what has concerned commentators critical
of the perceived excesses of the modern new arbitration regime.
Appreciating the differences between old and new arbitration provides a
principled means of distinguishing their treatment by the legal and political
system.  For the most part, traditional arbitration (including labor arbitration
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement) should be permitted to continue
largely as it has in the past.  However, the system should take some pains to
ensure that new, mass contract arbitration is governed by the more regulatory
regime proposed in Part III of this article.  This would ensure that specialized
arbitration among sophisticated parties would not be unduly stifled, leaving
35 See Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2004) (To
constitute “manifest disregard of law,” the arbitrators must have “appreciated[d] the exis-
tence of a clearly governing principle but decided to ignore or pay no attention to it” and the
law in question must have been “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.”  (citations
omitted)); Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping, 333 F.3d 383 (2d Cir.
2003); Drahozal, supra note 28 (collecting variant definitions and applications of manifest
disregard standard).
36 See Poser, supra note 28; see also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:  Judicial Stan-
dards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).
37 See Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, § 5 (Eng.); Arbitration
Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49, § 7 (Eng.); Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23, § 45 (prelimi-
nary issues) & § 69 (post-award appeal) (Eng.); see also HUBER & WESTON, supra note 2, at
595 (In permitting reversal of an arbitration decision that is “obviously wrong” or that poses
“serious doubt” about its correctness, “the English Arbitration Act does not make general
provision for review of questions of law, but the possibilities for review for claimed errors of
law is far greater than under the FAA or the UAA.”).
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room for these methods to act with informality and achieve contextual rough
justice.  At the same time, impoverished legal outcomes can be avoided in mass
contract arbitrations.
Validly consenting parties should be permitted to avoid the default rules of
the system for regulating mass arbitration.  For today’s traditional commercial
arbitration, this generally means a presumption of minimal mandates regarding
the arbitration and its review.  For mass arbitration, the presumption should be
in favor of fidelity to the applicable substantive law.  However, even in mass
arbitrations, freedom of contract principles should enable the parties to agree to
criteria for decision other than strict application of the law.  To be effective,
such agreements must possess sufficient evidence of knowing, informed, vol-
untary agreement, particularly by the party adhering to a mandatory arbitration
clause, who is usually an unsophisticated, one-shot player.
Parties can generally contract around default rules so long as this is done
clearly, knowingly, and voluntarily.  Consistent with that principle, parties to a
standard commercial arbitration should be able to, by express agreement, avoid
the default rule I propose:  that arbitration follow the law.  Reasonably sophisti-
cated commercial entities who find the default regulatory regime too con-
straining can avoid it and tailor arbitration to their particular needs.
In the bulk of mass contract arbitrations, the realities of the contracting
process are inherently unlikely to present a situation in which it can be said that
the parties have knowledgeably and freely chosen to escape or modify the
default rules imposed by the legal-political system.  A consumer at a big-box
retail outlet is not realistically able to conclude that her interests are best served
by arbitrating all disputes before a select arbitration provider subject to limited
remedies and to voluntarily form an agreement to that effect with the retailer.
If anything, sounder contractual analysis suggests that consumers in this situa-
tion do not validly consent to such arrangements even when they sign papers
containing text purporting to consent.  The problem gets worse when any text
requiring arbitration is found on the back of a ticket stub, in a package invoice,
or interposed as something that must be clicked to reach the next section of a
website order form.
In view of the problems of policing mass contracts for consent, informa-
tion exchange, and correct interpretation, the legal system and the public would
be far better off requiring a minimum level of neutrality and legality through
implementation of the measures proposed in Part III.  Without such policing,
the risk of kangaroo court outcomes will cloud mass arbitrations.  Licensing,
stricter standards regarding recusal, a presumption in favor of following the
law, and meaningful appellate review will add a measure of fairness and stabil-
ity to mass arbitration at little cost.
Where more sophisticated parties wish to customize any arbitration
between them, this should be presumptively permitted.  In mass arbitrations,
the parties should still be permitted to escape the default rule of following the
law (rather than general principles of fairness, equity, or a relevant trade)—but
only upon a showing of actual agreement by the parties under circumstances
that do not justify required application of the law to protect the weaker party.
This Article leaves for another day the question of how the legal system
separates traditional arbitration from mass arbitration for purposes of enforcing
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the controls and protections advocated in the Article.  Crafting an operational
definition for assigning arbitration to the two respective spheres will require
some care.  Line-drawing may be difficult in a few individual cases; but in
practice, arbitration clauses and arbitrations tend to divide in readily apparent
ways.  One can distinguish between an employer’s forms required when a new
worker comes to the job (mass arbitration) and an arbitration clause contained
in a sales agreement between merchants (traditional arbitration).  The legal sys-
tem needs to begin making and applying the distinction.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudential commitment to arbitration remains
strong even if its reasoning and appreciation of reality remains open to criti-
cism.  Within the fait accompli world of law and politics, we are unlikely to see
any complete about-face or substantial curtailment of the pro-arbitrability doc-
trine the Court has constructed.  The realistic response of consumer advocates
and other arbitration skeptics should be a focus on arbitral impartiality and
adherence to substantive law rather than undue resistance to arbitration clause
enforcement.  If these factors are present, the U.S. dispute resolution system
can be reasonably confident that arbitrations will not become kangaroo courts.
To the extent these traits are lacking, arbitration skeptics will continue to have
substantial grounds for continuing to criticize the modern world of court-
enforced, mass-standardized arbitration.
